England is the only nation in the United Kingdom without its own legislature. This is not a minor anomaly — it is a structural fault in the constitutional settlement that damages England, destabilises the union, and hollows out local democracy. The argument for change is constitutional, not nationalist. Here is the case in full.
Since devolution in 1999, MPs from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have been able to vote on legislation that affects only England — covering health, education, housing and policing — while English MPs have had no reciprocal say on those same matters in the devolved nations. This structural asymmetry was named the West Lothian question in 1977 by Tam Dalyell, who warned it would become untenable. He was right. Successive governments have acknowledged the problem and failed to resolve it.
England is home to 56 million people — around 84% of the UK's total population. Westminster is, in demographic terms, effectively the English Parliament. Yet England has no separate legislative chamber of its own. This means English domestic policy is made in the same institution that sets UK-wide policy on defence, foreign affairs and the constitution — with no separation of powers and no distinct English mandate. The result is that England dominates the union structurally while remaining voiceless institutionally.
Without a distinct tier of English governance, local elections have lost their purpose. They have become national referendums — on the government of the day, on immigration, on the cost of living — rather than genuine contests about local services, local priorities and local accountability. Councils are blamed for failures they did not cause and stripped of the fiscal powers to address the problems they can see. The 2026 local elections demonstrated this with painful clarity: a rout driven entirely by national sentiment, in which the state of the pavements barely featured.
Support for Scottish independence and Welsh autonomy has grown steadily since devolution. The grievance that sustains those movements is not, at its root, cultural: it is the perception that Scottish and Welsh interests are subordinated to English priorities at Westminster. That perception is constitutionally accurate. A Westminster institution shaped by English demographic weight makes decisions — on fiscal policy, on immigration, on public spending — that affect the devolved nations without any equalising mechanism. Giving England its own parliament removes that grievance at source.
England should have its own elected parliament with the same range of devolved powers currently held by Holyrood, the Senedd and Stormont: health, education, housing, policing, transport, local government and planning. It should be separately elected, with its own mandate, its own first minister and its own legislative programme. It should not sit at Westminster — that institution must be reserved for the reconstituted UK federal chamber.
With four national parliaments handling domestic affairs, Westminster's role changes fundamentally. It becomes the legislature of the United Kingdom for matters that belong to the union as a whole: defence and national security, foreign policy and treaty obligations, macro-economic and monetary policy, immigration, and inter-regional fiscal transfers. MPs at Westminster would represent the union, not their constituent nations' domestic interests. The West Lothian question dissolves — because there are no longer England-only votes to be had at Westminster.
The four national parliaments would hold equivalent domestic competencies. No nation's parliament would be subordinate to another's. England would not dominate the federal chamber by weight of numbers, because the federal chamber would deal only with genuinely shared matters on which all four nations have an equal stake. This is the constitutional logic of federalism: shared sovereignty on shared questions, distinct sovereignty on distinct ones.
With a dedicated English Parliament absorbing the national political debate about English domestic policy, local elections can return to their proper function. Councils would be accountable for what they control. English domestic policy would be contested at the English Parliament's elections. National UK policy would be contested at Westminster elections. Three tiers, three mandates, three distinct democratic conversations — instead of one Westminster institution trying to be all three at once and failing at each.
The argument for an English Parliament is sometimes met with the objection that it would create another layer of politicians and cost. That is a legitimate concern about implementation — but it is not an argument against the principle.
A reconstituted Westminster — reduced in scope to genuinely UK-wide matters — would require fewer MPs, not more. The English Parliament could absorb many of the functions currently performed by Westminster select committees, departmental scrutiny and the Commons chamber itself when dealing with England-only legislation.
The question is not whether we can afford an English Parliament. It is whether we can afford to keep pretending the current arrangement is working.
Sixteen state parliaments (Länder) hold domestic legislative competence over education, policing and culture. The federal Bundestag handles defence, foreign policy and macro-economics. The Bundesrat gives the Länder a formal voice in federal legislation. Stable, prosperous and — critically — holds together a nation reunified after division.
Six state parliaments govern health, education, policing and infrastructure. The federal Parliament in Canberra handles defence, immigration, foreign affairs and national economic policy. The federation has survived over a century, multiple economic crises and deep internal disagreements — because the constitutional division of powers gives each tier a clear mandate.
Ten provincial parliaments control health care, education and civil law. The federal Parliament in Ottawa manages defence, criminal law and inter-provincial trade. Canada contains profound linguistic, cultural and regional differences — and has managed them for over 150 years within a federal framework that respects both unity and diversity.
Fifty state legislatures hold extensive domestic powers. Congress handles defence, foreign affairs, immigration and interstate commerce. The Tenth Amendment reserves all unenumerated powers to the states. The oldest written federal constitution in continuous use — the model that all subsequent federal settlements have studied.
The United Kingdom is already, in practice, a quasi-federal state. It has devolved legislatures in three of its four constituent nations. It has a Supreme Court. It has a written devolution settlement upheld by statute.
What it lacks is the final piece: a legislature for England, and a Westminster that knows its own boundaries. Every major democracy that has faced the challenge of governing multiple nations or regions within a single state has arrived at the same answer. The United Kingdom is not a special case. It is simply an unfinished one.